Ricardo Chavira Chicano

We Were Always Here: A Mexicn American's Odyssey

Category: Uncategorized

  • This information comes as a big relief, because for the past few months, I thought I might be one.

    The Department of Homeland Security, earlier this week, notified me that officials concluded that I have no terrorist affiliation. I started to believe that I could have ties of that nature. My doubt stemmed from two unpleasant incidents I experienced while crossing by foot from Mexico into the United States.

    Twice in a row, Customs and Border Protection officers pulled me out of line and escorted me to a room for secondary inspection. Experience has taught me to be wary of cops. So, I was apprehensive as I was escorted, not simply directed, to the appropriate room, about 40 feet away from the line. Did the cops think I might try to escape, and thus required an escort?

    The inspections involved a deep online look at me. I sent a complaint to DHS, saying I was needlessly humiliated. Why was I subjected to such treatment.

    Here is part of the cryptic reply: “DHS TRIP has researched and completed our review of your case. DHS TRIP can neither confirm nor deny any information about you which may be within federal watchlists or reveal any law enforcement sensitive information.”

    Somewhat ominously, the letter noted that “about 2% of the DHS TRIP complainants actually have some connection to the Terrorist Watchlist.”

    My translation is that we have nothing on you. At least for now.

  • The current Iran–U.S.–Israel war has evolved into a multi‑theater regional conflict without a clear political end state. It spans Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and the maritime domain around the Strait of Hormuz, and interacts directly with global energy markets and alliance politics. Civilian casualties, displacement, and infrastructure damage are already high, and each new front or incident introduces fresh risks of miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation.

    Washington and Jerusalem have pursued ambitious, shifting objectives: degrading Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities, curbing its regional proxies, and at times nudging toward regime‑change logic. They have inflicted serious damage on Iranian leadership, military infrastructure, and defense‑industrial capacity, while strengthening regional missile defense and interception. Iran, however, continues firing missiles and drones, maintains regime cohesion, and leverages economic tools—especially in Hormuz—to impose costs on adversaries and the world economy. From Tehran’s perspective, mere survival and continued capacity to hurt opponents and disrupt trade can be framed as victory.

    Israel is under intense multi‑front strain but not yet at the point of outright overextension. It is simultaneously striking deep into Iran, fighting a heavy campaign along the Lebanese front against Hezbollah, defending its cities against long‑range missiles and drones, and managing residual Gaza and internal security demands. Hezbollah’s infrastructure and freedom of movement have been heavily degraded, yet it retains significant rocket and drone arsenals and trained cadres. Israel’s binding constraints are less about immediate force collapse and more about reservist fatigue, economic disruption, civilian vulnerability, and reliance on U.S. logistical and diplomatic backing.

    The gravest escalation risks cluster around several “red lines.” Strikes on or near nuclear facilities such as Dimona or Natanz are a qualitative escalation because any radiological incident could drive leaders to massive retaliation. Large, highly visible civilian massacres or a catastrophic attack on U.S. forces could likewise narrow the space for compromise and push toward maximal war aims. However, the most likely trigger for a much larger war is decisive escalation around the Strait of Hormuz and regional energy infrastructure. Iran’s strongest leverage is economic: moving from partial disruption and informal tolls to a de facto blockade, coupled with systematic attacks on Gulf energy and port facilities, would cross red lines for Europe, Asia, and Gulf monarchies and almost certainly provoke a broad multinational military response. That, in turn, would push Tehran to fully activate its proxy networks, transforming today’s grinding war into a far more general Middle East conflagration.

  • The current Iran–U.S.–Israel war has evolved into a multi‑theater regional conflict without a clear political end state. It spans Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and the maritime domain around the Strait of Hormuz, and interacts directly with global energy markets and alliance politics. Civilian casualties, displacement, and infrastructure damage are already high, and each new front or incident introduces fresh risks of miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation.

    Washington and Jerusalem have pursued ambitious, shifting objectives: degrading Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities, curbing its regional proxies, and at times nudging toward regime‑change logic.

    They have inflicted serious damage on Iranian leadership, military infrastructure, and defense‑industrial capacity, while strengthening regional missile defense and interception. Iran, however, continues firing missiles and drones, maintains regime cohesion, and leverages economic tools—especially in Hormuz—to impose costs on adversaries and the world economy. From Tehran’s perspective, mere survival and continued capacity to hurt opponents and disrupt trade can be framed as victory.

    Israel is under intense multi‑front strain but not yet at the point of outright overextension. It is simultaneously striking deep into Iran, fighting a heavy campaign along the Lebanese front against Hezbollah, defending its cities against long‑range missiles and drones, and managing residual Gaza and internal security demands. Hezbollah’s infrastructure and freedom of movement have been heavily degraded, yet it retains significant rocket and drone arsenals and trained cadres.

    Israel’s binding constraints are less about immediate force collapse and more about reservist fatigue, economic disruption, civilian vulnerability, and reliance on U.S. logistical and diplomatic backing.

    The gravest escalation risks cluster around several “red lines.” Strikes on or near nuclear facilities such as Dimona or Natanz are a qualitative escalation because any radiological incident could drive leaders to massive retaliation. Large, highly visible civilian massacres or a catastrophic attack on U.S. forces could likewise narrow space for compromise and push toward maximal war aims.

    However, the most likely trigger for a much larger war is decisive escalation around the Strait of Hormuz and regional energy infrastructure. Iran’s strongest leverage is economic: moving from partial disruption and informal tolls to a de facto blockade, coupled with systematic attacks on Gulf energy and port facilities, would cross red lines for Europe, Asia, and Gulf monarchies and almost certainly provoke a broad multinational military response. That, in turn, would push Tehran to fully activate its proxy networks, transforming today’s grinding war into a far more general Middle East conflagration.

  • During my many reporting trips to El Salvador, I learned what can happen under a thuggish regime that will not tolerate peaceful dissent. A jocular guerrilla leader who fought the Salvadoran dictatorship along with hundreds of other FMLN members told me that he wished he had not been driven to engage in combat.

    For many years, he told me, opponents peacefully protested only to meet with savage government violence. The leader, who used the pseudonym Benito Juarez, said he and thousands of others like him were committed to toppling the government by any means possible.

    Are Americans willing to endure the gradual destruction of the nation, in which people live like this?

  • Who was Carlos Andres Perez? What did the US have to do with him?

    Carlos Andrés Pérez (1922-2010) was a pivotal figure in modern Venezuelan history who served as president during two critical periods: 1974-1979 and 1989-1993. His relationship with the United States evolved from a cooperative partnership during the oil nationalization era to direct support during crises in his second term, making him a key case study in U.S.-Latin American relations during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

    Early Life and Political Foundation

    Pérez emerged from Venezuela’s democratic opposition movement, joining the liberal Acción Democrática (AD) party led by Rómulo Betancourt. After the 1945 revolution that overthrew military rule, Pérez served as Betancourt’s personal secretary, establishing his credentials within Venezuela’s emerging democratic elite. When a right-wing coup exiled AD leaders in 1948, Pérez spent a decade in exile and imprisonment before returning in 1958 after the fall of Marcos Pérez Jiménez’s dictatorship.

    During the 1960s, Pérez directed the Ministry of Interior (1962-1963), where he suppressed left-wing radicals challenging the Betancourt government. This hardline stance against communist insurgents earned him credibility with Washington while demonstrating his commitment to Venezuela’s democratic continuity. By the 1970s, Pérez had consolidated power within AD, positioning himself for national leadership.

    First Presidency (1974-1979): The Oil Nationalization Era

    Pérez won the 1973 presidential election by a wide margin, campaigning on a platform of national sovereignty and economic transformation. His administration coincided with the OPEC oil price revolution, providing Venezuela with unprecedented petroleum revenues that increased per capita income by approximately 40%.

    The 1976 Oil Nationalization

    On January 1, 1976, Pérez fulfilled his campaign promise by nationalizing Venezuela’s entire oil industry, creating the state-owned enterprise Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). This move affected major U.S. companies, including ExxonMobil, which had dominated Venezuelan production since the 1920s. Contrary to subsequent political narratives, the nationalization was “relatively uncontroversial” and fully compensated foreign firms with approximately $1 billion in payments.

    The United States responded with remarkable restraint. Despite losing direct control over Venezuelan oil assets, Washington maintained friendly relations because:

    • Pérez preserved foreign technical and managerial personnel to ensure efficient operations.
    • PDVSA continued partnering with U.S. companies under joint ventures where Venezuela held 60% equity
    • Venezuela remained a reliable oil supplier, refusing to join the Arab oil embargo and supporting U.S. energy security
    • Pérez compensated American firms rather than expropriating assets without payment

    Strategic Autonomy Within Partnership

    While preserving U.S. friendship, Pérez demonstrated strategic autonomy by:

    • Supporting Panama’s demand for control of the Panama Canal
    • Reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba (broken since 1961)
    • Channeling petroleum income into domestic hydroelectric projects, education, and steel mills
    • Slowing oil production to conserve resources

    This balanced approach allowed Pérez to modernize Venezuela’s infrastructure while maintaining Washington’s support, exemplifying the “punto fijo” democracy’s ability to navigate between national sovereignty and U.S. interests.

    Second Presidency (1989-1993): Crisis and U.S. Intervention

    After a decade-long legal prohibition on reelection, Pérez returned to the presidency in 1989, winning on nostalgia for the prosperity of his first term. However, Venezuela’s international reserves had dwindled to only $300 million, and the country faced a mounting debt crisis.

    The Caracazo and U.S. Support

    On February 27, 1989, Pérez implemented an IMF-sponsored “economic package” that removed fuel and transport subsidies, triggering the Caracazo—four days of nationwide protests, riots, and looting. The government responded by suspending constitutional guarantees and deploying the military, resulting in an estimated 300-3,000 civilian deaths.

    During the massacre, President George H.W. Bush personally called Pérez on March 3, 1989, offering a $450 million emergency loan and commiserating with his handling of the crisis. This direct presidential support demonstrated Washington’s commitment to maintaining Pérez’s pro-market government despite its violent repression of popular dissent. The U.S. media subsequently portrayed Pérez as a “charismatic social democrat” while ignoring the Caracazo’s human rights violations.

    The 1992 Coup Attempts and U.S. Backing

    Pérez’s unpopularity following the Caracazo created conditions for military rebellion. On February 4, 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez led a coup attempt against Pérez, attacking the presidential residence and key installations. A second attempt occurred on November 27, 1992.

    The United States provided crucial support to Pérez during these crises:

    • The Bush administration maintained firm backing for Venezuela’s “durable democracy”
    • U.S. intelligence monitored coup plotting but shared information with Pérez’s government
    • After the failed coups, Washington praised Pérez’s survival while blaming Chávez’s “oppressive methods”
    • The U.S. recognized Pérez’s legitimacy despite his minimal popular support

    When Chávez appeared on television, calling for surrender “por ahora” (for now), he became a folk hero among the poor, who viewed him as fighting Pérez’s corruption. This moment catalyzed Chávez’s political career, ultimately leading to his 1998 presidential victory.

    U.S.-Venezuela Relations Under Pérez: A Complex Partnership

    Personal Diplomacy

    Pérez cultivated a close personal relationship with George H.W. Bush, who visited Caracas in 1990. Declassified documents reveal their extensive cooperation on Central America, where Pérez served as an intermediary with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, Cuban leader Fidel Castro, and Salvadoran rebels. Bush relied on Pérez’s regional influence, while Pérez secured U.S. debt relief assistance.

    Economic Integration

    Venezuela’s economy remained deeply integrated with the United States:

    • By the 1970s, U.S. refineries were specifically designed to process Venezuela’s heavy, sour crude
    • Venezuela supplied nearly one-sixth of U.S. oil consumption
    • American oil companies received $1 billion in compensation for nationalized assets
    • Pérez’s government accepted IMF loans despite previously calling the institution a “neutron bomb”

    Democratic Conditionality

    Washington’s support for Pérez reflected a broader strategy of promoting “democratic” leaders who implemented neoliberal reforms. As one analysis noted, “it did not matter if they were social democrats (such as Carlos Andrés Pérez) or conservatives—what mattered was their alignment with U.S. economic interests”.

    Downfall and Legacy

    In May 1993, the Supreme Court indicted Pérez for embezzling 250 million bolívars ($2.7 million) from a presidential discretionary fund, making him Venezuela’s first impeached president. He was sentenced to house arrest and later fled to Miami in 2002 to avoid Caracazo-related charges.

    Long-term Implications for U.S.-Venezuela Relations

    Pérez’s presidency established patterns that shaped subsequent U.S.-Venezuela relations:

    1. Oil as leverage: The 1976 nationalization model—state control with foreign partnership—persisted until Chávez’s 2005 expropriations
    2. Democratic legitimacy: Washington’s support for Pérez despite his unpopularity set precedents for backing Venezuelan governments based on alignment rather than popular mandate
    3. Coup politics: U.S. involvement in 1992 coup monitoring foreshadowed more direct participation in the 2002 coup against Chávez
    4. Economic conditionality: IMF-sponsored reforms under Pérez created the social crisis that ultimately produced Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution

    The Trump administration’s 2025 military intervention and claims that Venezuela “stole” U.S. oil directly reference the 1976 nationalization under Pérez. This historical revisionism ignores the compensated, negotiated nature of the takeover and reflects a continuity in U.S. policy: treating Venezuelan sovereignty over oil resources as conditional on alignment with American interests.

    Carlos Andrés Pérez embodied the contradictions of Cold War Latin American democracy—simultaneously advancing national sovereignty through oil nationalization while depending on U.S. support to maintain power against domestic opposition. His relationship with Washington demonstrates how the United States balanced strategic partnership with democratic rhetoric, ultimately prioritizing stable access to Venezuelan oil over concerns for human rights or popular sovereignty.

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  • Except for a few years, and despite being a third-generation United States-born citizen, I have never felt affection for the American government.

    By the time I was six, I understood that the United States was not a country that embraced Mexicans, no matter where we were born.  At that age, it was by design that we did not have careers comparable to our white compatriots.  Assessing my world, I concluded Mexicans were consigned to non-prestigious manual labor or low-end retail workers, the folks who waited on restaurant customers, or labored in the construction industry.

    I appreciated the many opportunities to carve out a job that would be decorous and respectable.  Now that I am 75, I am still thankful for the hard-fought chances to make something of myself.

    The American government opened the door just a crack to earn college degrees and gave me a fighting chance to get a foothold in a career that guaranteed my family and me middle-class lives.  Significantly, this included a shot at getting my children into top-tier universities.

    My grandparents’ and parents’ haunting accounts of pathological racism seeded the alienation.  The estrangement was greatly augmented by my own struggles to cope with blatant and insidious institutional racism.

    Yet, I did not move to another country because none were accessible to me.  Even as an ethnic Mexican, I had no close familial ties to my ancestral homeland, essentially putting citizenship out of reach.

    Despite all that I have just written, I found security and a degree of comfort in my country.  It was famously and justifiably known as a nation of laws.  The three branches of power, checks and balances, guaranteed that the United States would not descend into dictatorial rule.  That was the fate of the world’s poor nations that had never known democracy.

    I saw it routinely tested and brutally tried during Watergate and the Iran-Contra scandal.  The executive branch went rogue, but it was thwarted and more or less returned to its proper role.  Supreme Court rulings instantly became the law of the land.

    Before the Trump ascendancy, there were only ten times that presidents either openly disagreed with rulings, ignored, or defied them.  The president has openly defied 57 federal court rulings.

    Moreover, he has routinely overreached his executive authority.  Just in the first six months of his presidency, Trump has shattered modern history records by issuing more than 280 executive orders and proclamations.  Those have been answered by approximately 300 lawsuits.  Often, those are of no consequence because he will appeal to the rubber-stamp Supreme Court.

    Congress is another rubber-stamp body, with Republicans morphed into Trump cultists.

    We have an outright tyrant on the rise, and there is nothing in sight to check him.  Anti-Trump protests are little more than political theater.  He and his acolytes are winning the struggle to quash the Epstein files.

    If I stick around long enough, I probably will live under a dictatorship.

    French philosopher Joseph de Maistre originated the phrase “every country gets the government it deserves.”  At this historical juncture, I’m unsure if that is true.

  • A Tale of Two Presidents

    For the United States media, Mexico is a problematic nation. Its people come here illegally, snatch up jobs, and aid in the influx of narcotics into the country.

    Mexico itself is mired in poverty and corruption. Violence is widespread, and economic opportunities are constrained. That is the standard view, propagated by the media.

    However, journalists practically ignore the profound history being made to our south.

    This is thanks to the 11-month tenure of Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Presidential terms in Mexico are six years.

    Sheinbaum’s achievements so far center on advancing sweeping legislative reforms, improving the economy, and launching ambitious policies in social welfare, security, gender equality, and infrastructure.

    Homicide rates have dropped by approximately 16–25%, with daily homicides down from 86.9 to 64.5 in the first months of her term.

    Organized crime groups, including the Sinaloa Cartel, have been targeted with expanded intelligence and military operations, resulting in significant arrests and record drug and narcotic seizures.

    Major deployment of the National Guard and implementation of gun buyback programs have bolstered public safety initiatives.

    Landmark constitutional amendments have enshrined social programs, raised the minimum wage by 12%, and advanced the elevation of gender equality and anti-discrimination.

    Social benefits for women aged 60–64 and new programs for students and pensioners have been launched, continuing and expanding AMLO-era welfare.

    Mexico reached record foreign direct investment, is now the US’s largest trading partner, and sits as the world’s 12th largest economy.

    Tax collection increased 8.5% annually in the first eight months of 2025, while inflation dipped to 3.5%.

    Public works include new highways, completed Maya Train rail operations, new schools, and expanded healthcare facilities.

    She is the first woman and Jewish person to be elected president of Mexico, representing a historic milestone for gender representation.

    Constitutional reforms effected pay equity, enhanced protections against gender violence, and established a Ministry of Women.

    Approval ratings have consistently exceeded 70–78%, making Sheinbaum Mexico’s most popular president at this stage in decades.

    The Mexican leader publicly acknowledges the severe challenges facing the nation, and she vows to keep tackling them.

    Oh, and President Sheinbaum is one of just seven world leaders with a doctorate.

    Mexico and the United States have always been dissimilar. This is particularly true when assessing the current governments.

    What to make of Donald Trump?

    To begin, let’s examine the economy.

    Tariffs have led to a significant contraction of the US economy, with persistent adverse effects on GDP, rising unemployment, and widespread job losses, particularly among government workers, since their imposition in 2025.

    US real GDP growth over 2025 and 2026 has been about 0.5 percentage points lower each year because of tariffs, shrinking the economy by -0.4% in the long run ( a loss of roughly $125 billion annually in 2024 dollars).

     The unemployment rate rose by 0.3 percentage points by the end of 2025, and payroll employment is 505,000 lower, with economic pain especially intense in manufacturing, agriculture, and construction. Tariffs have generated government revenue—up to 5% of the federal budget—but the fiscal gains are offset by dynamic revenue declines as the broader economy contracts.

    Job losses have been widespread, with manufacturing output up 2.1% but more than offset by declines in sectors like construction (-3.6%) and agriculture (-0.8%).

    Additional losses result from foreign retaliation, such as China’s counter-tariffs, which contributed to hundreds of thousands more lost jobs. The August 2025 jobs report noted only 22,000 jobs added, with layoffs in the federal government, construction, and retail directly tied to tariff policies.

    The hardest hit sector has been federal government employment. Nearly 300,000 government jobs have been eliminated so far in 2025, surpassing other sectors—with 84,000 federal positions lost between January and July, and an additional 20,000 expected to be lost in August.

    Many job reductions come from buyouts, layoffs, and program cuts, and tens of thousands of government workers remain in deferred resignation programs. These cuts have ongoing and not fully reflected impacts in monthly data due to legal challenges, with continued acceleration expected.

    Trump has a thing for legal battles.

    Over 337 active cases are challenging the Trump administration’s actions. More than 186 legal actions have been filed against the administration since January 2025.         

    There are about 298 active cases specifically challenging administration actions, with dozens more related cases.

    The Supreme Court has been particularly active in 2025 regarding Trump-related cases:

    Several rulings have been made on executive orders, including those regarding birthright citizenship, deportations, federal worker dismissals, and agency restructuring.

     Some rulings favor the administration; others block its actions.

    Significant legal challenges include: Birthright citizenship restrictions, federal worker dismissals, and “Reductions in force,” immigration and deportation policies

    Trump has been involved in hundreds of court cases in 2025, ranging from his ongoing personal criminal and civil appeals to the massive wave of litigation challenging his administration’s executive actions.

    While the exact total number fluctuates as cases are filed, dismissed, or resolved, the litigation tracker shows over 337 active cases against his administration alone, making 2025 one of the most legally contentious years for any presidency.

    The huge takeaway is that while the Trump regime has overseen a troubled economy and been tangled in one legal tussle after another, Claudia Sheinbaum is focused on moving Mexico forward.

  • Before Osama Bin Laden, there was Pancho Villa. Neither needs an introduction. However, it is not widely known that the Mexican revolutionary organized what many consider the first terrorist attack on United States soil and a massive manhunt on foreign soil.

    On March 15, 1916, 10,000 American troops invaded Mexico, storming across the border in Chihuahua. Just 70 years earlier, nearly 80,000 United States soldiers and sailors attacked Mexico.

    These conflicts tore apart already tenuous relations between the nations. Yet, they alone did not poison the atmosphere that prevented the countries from being staunch allies. The earlier aggression marked only the second time the United States declared war. Significantly, it was an expansionist war, one that dispossessed Mexico of half its territory.

    From the outset, Mexico and the United States were destined to be antagonistic neighbors. Tension and conflict best characterize ties even today. It became a long-running story of a powerful and aggressive nascent empire—the United States—trampling, bullying, and even brutalizing a weak and troubled country, Mexico. Today, official contact between Mexico City and Washington is tense and even tortured. Proximity has bred mistrust and dislike. There is also hubris and disdain that have long informed the official United  States view of Mexico.

     On August 13, 2025, a video shows Trump stating: ‘Mexico does what we tell them to do and Canada does what we tell them to do because we have the two borders. ‘”

    On February 1, 2025, President Donald Trump uttered menacing and poisonous lies about a country with which it shares deeply rooted ties. Few countries are as naturally linked. Trump’s words were those reserved for enemies.

    “The Mexican drug trafficking organizations have an intolerable alliance with the government of Mexico. The government of Mexico has afforded safe havens for the cartels to engage in the manufacturing and transportation of dangerous narcotics, which collectively have led to the overdose deaths of hundreds of thousands of American victims.

     Trump’s fusillade went on.

    “This alliance endangers the national security of the United States, and we must eradicate the influence of these dangerous cartels.

    “The sustained influx of illegal aliens,” he alleged, “has profound consequences on every aspect of our national life – overwhelming our schools, lowering our wages, reducing our housing supply and raising rents, overcrowding our hospitals, draining our welfare system, and causing crime.”

  • Coffee With a Monster

    “Are you a communist?” Roberto D’Aubuissson shouted at me, his face contorted by rage.

    With that question, I found myself in one of the most perilous interviews I have ever conducted. Minutes earlier, he and I sipped coffee. Then things turned ugly.

    My inquisitor was among El Salvador’s most savage killers, a death squad leader and ultra-right-wing politician. In the name of fighting communism, D’Aubuisson kidnapped and tortured hundreds of Salvadorans. Years after the crime, he was found to be instrumental in the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero.

    He was a presidential candidate in 1984, and I went to his home for an interview. A chain smoker and non-stop coffee drinker, D’Aubuisson always appeared tense and sometimes angry.

    A former intelligence officer, he founded the rightwing party, National Republican Alliance. As the party’s standard bearer, he made public, thinly veiled threats against alleged communists.

    D’Aubuisson continued his savage rampage with the full knowledge and implicit blessing of Washington. The United States and the mass killer shared the same anti-communist fervor.

    This is relevant history because it underscores the current U.S. government’s working alliance with the Salvadoran government. The Trump regime and the Nayib Bukele dictatorship have common ground in how to manage those who break the law.

    Trump and Bukele put no premium on human rights.

    I enraged D’Aubuisson by asking about what were then rumors of his death squad activities. Several of his hulking henchmen moved close to me as the fanatic berated me for asking questions he did not like

    In that moment, I felt a palpable menace and feared that I might not leave unscathed.

    Throughout my 30-year journalistic career, only a handful of individuals have emanated pure evil. This man did, and it is chilling to think that our government turned a blind eye towards this monster.

  • California Mexicans and the Terror of the White Invasion

    Today is a good time to revive the story of what happened to California Mexicans when the state suffered a white invasion, just 177 years ago.

    In Los Angeles and all over the state, terrible things happened to Mexicans. At least 163 Mexicans were lynched there between 1848 and 1860. Ken-Kay Gonzalez deserves credit for this information.

    Mobs lynched a boy, 15-year-old Francisco Cotta, in 1861. He was first dragged through downtown. He was hanged close to the intersection of what are now Union Station and the Metropolitan Detention Center.

    Lynch mobs took a liking to the spot where Temple crosses Broadway. Few were prosecuted for these crimes, usually committed in daytime hours. Crowds converged on the murder sites to watch the hangings.

    Statewide, during those years, 170 lynchings of Mexicans occurred.

    I unearth this horrific history because it needs to be told, especially now.

     ICE goons are dragging away Latinos to uncertain fates. No matter what crime those arrested may have committed, anonymous goon squads revive thoughts of mob justice.

    Nowadays, European Americans are unsettled by the masses of brown people streaming into California. Fears that Latino immigrants come to rob and pillage en masse are demonstrably untrue.

    But the fright Mexican and indigenous people in California  felt at the coming wave of European Americans was solidly based.

    There were an estimated 14,000 Mexicans and 300,000 indigenous people who lived in California.

    By the 1880s, the indigenous population stood at 30,000. They were the survivors of systematic slaughter and disease.

    Credit for this work goes to historian Arturo Marcial Gonzalez. He wrote of a period in American history that has been cast into the void.

     It is a well-documented narrative of one of the many chapters in United States history that lay bare the sometimes brutal and racist behavior of European American occupiers.

     The mass influx of European Americans into California is one such period. A handful of scholars, among them Leonard Pitt, extensively documented the Californios’ traumatic experience of suddenly being transformed from large landowners to peons.

    They feared loss of their rights, but much worse took place: violence, some of it fatal.

    The killings were not limited to lynchings. Some victims suffered death by beating.

     During the Gold Rush, Mexican miners and workers, simply seeking a better life, were attacked by white mobs eager to claim their gold and land.

    Those murders and lynchings rarely included police arrests. Newspapers of the time often justified or even celebrated the violence.

    Many names and stories have been lost, hidden in forgotten court records and yellowed newspaper clippings, or carried quietly in the memories of those who survived.

    For decades, we, California Mexicans, have seen the demographics transformed. It’s hard to imagine Los Angeles County when I was growing up there in the 1950s.

     More than 93 percent of residents were white, and we, Mexican Americans, comprised a bit over 7 percent. And we lived in distinct, shabby neighborhoods. White America existed in a parallel world.  

    Our restrained acceptance and acculturation into White customs have been smooth. No white folks have been lynched.

    We all know what is happening to our brothers and sisters under the Trump regime. Aside from scattered protests, we have quietly accepted our dehumanization. Think of Alligator Alley. Do we need to be presented as macabre theater?