From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, I spent many days embedded with El Salvador’s leftist rebel combatants. I was a journalist.
The experience was illuminating for many reasons. El Salvador is about the size of Massachusetts and densely populated, ill-suited for a vibrant insurgency. But the rebels, grouped in an alliance known as the FMLN, sank deep roots and thrived. What I saw first-hand is completely applicable to the Hamas-Israel conflict.
The rebels had at most 9,000 combatants, while the opposing Salvadoran combat forces totaled 50,000. The army was amply armed with conventional weapons and aircraft. Significantly, between 55 and 141 American military advisers were on the ground largely directing the war. There were an unknown number of CIA officials also in El Salvador helping with intelligence-gathering and sundry counterinsurgency efforts.
As in the case of Hamas, the aim was to eradicate the FMLN. That goal was not achieved; a negotiated peace accord ended the fighting.
The insurgents had broad popular support. I saw peasants feed rebels and provide intelligence. They also guarded hidden arms caches. This help was crucial to keep the rebels fighting effectiveness.
Rebels were entirely committed to a political cause and took it for granted that they would die or suffer torture if captured. The FMLN commanders were organized in cells; there was a line of succession to take the place of leaders killed or captured.
In this excerpt from my book, I describe time spent with rebel commander Cirilo and his fellow combatants. Interestingly, two Spanish nuns arranged the encounter. Cirilo died fighting.
Cirilo is with a group of some 30 heavily armed fighters camped on a coffee plantation just seven miles from Santa Ana’s provincial capital, the site of a major army base. In recent months, ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army) regulars and dozens of new peasant militias have attacked military outposts, ambushed patrols, and even briefly taken a town near the Guatemalan border.
The guerrillas’ bold entry into the region, together with a sudden surge in FMLN urban violence is a graphic demonstration of what even the Bush Administration privately acknowledges is the FMLN’s improved military prowess.
Despite the infusion of $3.4 billion in American aid over the past eight years, the Salvadoran government is not even close to winning the civil war. Troops killed most of the guerrilla leaders in the west eight years ago, forcing the FMLN out of the area. The rebels’ return underscores their new strength and the army’s inability to vanquish them permanently
Ricardo Chavira Chicano 